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Friday, October 22, 2004

Bad Idea?

I realize that the following is probably not a good idea, since the few visitors I have will probably flee from my blog after such a boring post; however, I don't have time to write anything else right now, and you may find it "educational." In any case, the following is a paper I wrote last week for American Diplomatic History describing the way in which Unilateralism was first adopted as a main foreign policy strategy of the United States. Since I haven't gotten it back yet, we can even play a game... just read it and then make bets on what my grade will be. Enjoy!

Unilateralism in the Forge

Within the context of today’s international system, the term “unilateralism” seems to have the ring of a nasty word. In certain circles, the word can call to mind images of imperialism, interventionism, oppression and even abuse. However, as far as concerns the United States, it may be said that it was precisely to avoid such dangers that Unilateralism arose as a foreign policy tradition in the first place. Formally, this particular approach to international relations was established by President Washington (and his co-author, Alexander Hamilton) during his 1796 Farewell Address as an equally idealistic and realistic strategy, which declared that it must be the United States’ “true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world so far as we are now at liberty to do it.” Although it is clear that Washington’s pronouncement was neither unanimously accepted nor actually revolutionary, it remains as a point of reference that should be properly comprehended by those who wish to find their way within the country’s international relations roadmap. To develop such an understanding of the Farewell Address, it is necessary to study more closely the foreign policy principles which it champions, as well as the main ideas and events that helped to usher-in its inception. After such an analysis, it will be clear that the tradition of Unilateralism was indeed adopted both on idealistic and realistic grounds.

If one had to briefly sum up the foreign policy principles put forth by Washington and Hamilton, it might be said that they consisted in (1) suspicion of European powers and their manipulative diplomacy, (2) opposition to permanent alliances with other states, (3) respecting but not prolonging existing alliances, and (4) accepting “temporary alliances [only] for extraordinary emergencies.” However, all this can be further summarized in the words of Thomas Jefferson as a call for “no entangling alliances.” As explained by Dr. Walter McDougall in Promised Land, Crusader State, the authors of the Farewell Address hoped that such a policy would allow them to avoid becoming pawns of Europe while upholding liberty at home (McDougall, p. 42). McDougall points out that this was a sensible approach given that:
First, if the United States became enmeshed in war and imperialism on the European model, it would have to raise large armies and navies, tax and conscript its people, and generally compromise domestic freedom, the Republic’s raison d’être. Second, if it became enmeshed in Europe’s conflicts, the United States would be forced to play junior partner in alliances with mighty empires, perhaps losing, or losing sight of, its own national interests, Third, if it became enmeshed in foreign conflicts, the European powers would compete for Americans’ affections, corrupt their politics with propaganda and bribes, and split them into factions. Fourth, if the United States joined in Europe’s rivalries, the arenas of battle would surely include America’s own lands and waters, as they had for over a century (McDougall, p. 42).

Thus, since these policies were not only crafted to respond in an adequate manner to the international relations challenges of the time, but were also aimed at preserving domestic freedom (one of the nation’s key values), it may be logically concluded that Unilateralism was simultaneously an idealistic and realistic tradition.

As must be clear, however, Unilateralism did not arise in an ideological vacuum. Indeed, this foreign policy approach was constructed on the foundation of another American tradition that reaches back to the very foundation of the country and may be considered somewhat of a truism or even a cliché: the idea of American “Exceptionalism,” or as McDougall prefers, Liberty. This broad idea had many different manifestations, but in general all that held it viewed the nascent state as a sort of beacon of freedom that was critically different from the societies of the Old World. “Exceptionalism” viewed the United States as special due to its rich and extensive lands that were separated from Europe by an ocean, to its varied and fertile population “drawn from several nations…and religious denominations,” and to its tradition of self-government (McDougall, p. 16). Furthermore, Americans cherished religious freedom (though understood in a more limited manner than today), civil liberties, free trade and representative government (McDougall, p. 18-21; LaFeber, p. 8-12). How, then, did this idealistic tradition on the domestic level affect the conduct of American foreign policy? The short answer to this is that while at times there were drives to either export these ideals in a crusading manner or apply them to diplomacy through a rejection of power politics, certain events that Americans had to confront led them to the understanding that such efforts would only be self-defeating and that foreign policy should just remain an instrument to ensure that Liberty was preserved within the nation.

During the years leading up to the formulation of Unilateralism as a foreign policy tradition in 1796, several events connected to the French Revolution, convinced Hamilton and Washington, as well as many other Americans, that such as strategy was necessary to prevent foreign intrigues from disturbing the nature of the domestic American system. When revolution broke out in France in 1789, Americans for a while became increasingly enthusiastic about the prospect of having a sister republic working with the hostile Atlantic system of imperial powers. Thus, when republican France declared war on monarchical Europe, many Americans saw it as natural to align themselves with the French against their British enemies. Although no such alignment ever actually occurred, and although most Americans actually favored the policy of strict neutrality put forth by the government, the interesting thing is that the mere desire of some to favor one nation over another had a significant effect within the country’s domestic arena (McDougall, p. 29). In fact, McDougall states that this question engendered “an internal debate so agonizing that it gave birth to the American two-party system” (McDougall, p. 29). He then goes on to point out that, surprisingly enough, the driving force behind this debate was not even actual foreign policy (since very few Americans actually advocated entry into the European war), but rather concern for what a tilt toward France or Britain might mean in terms of domestic policy. Thus, the real problem was that “Democratic Republicans saw the Federalists’ pro-British stance as evidence of their favor for a hierarchical society at home, [while] Federalists saw the Democratic Republicans’ pro-French stance as indicative of their favor for extreme democracy at home” (McDougall, p. 29). The fact that such deep dilemmas could arise from the mere suggestion of aligning policy with a foreign state should be enough to advocate for a policy of unilateralism, but other related events were to make the choice an even clearer one.

It should be noted that if such profound divisions arose without the need of external assistance, foreign powers might well be tempted to manipulate so susceptible a population in order to satisfy their interests. Thus, it was not long before Edmond Charles “Citizen” Genêt arrived as minister from the French Republic to the United States with the mission of tipping the balance in favor of his country. Genêt attempted to use the support he initially received from much of the US population to turn public opinion away from a position of neutrality. When this failed, he began to covertly outfit ships to “prey on British merchantmen in American costal waters” and plotted to create anti-British militias throughout several regions of the continent (McDougall, p. 29). Although his designs generally met with failure and Washington soon demanded his recall, other foreign policy issues continued to create internal turmoil throughout this period. Indeed, a rather violent controversy arose when John Jay returned from Britain in 1794 after having negotiated a trade treaty with that country. Democratic Republicans accused Jay and other Federalists of being traitors, and these promptly returned their public insults in like manner. The struggle reached such a point that although Jay had gotten Britain to agree “to abandon its forts on the Great lakes and grant the United States ‘most favored nation’ status” the treaty remained without being ratified until the apparent treason of Edmund Randolph, Jefferson’s successor as Secretary of State, “demoralized the opposition” (McDougall, p. 30). The Randolph incident was yet another case of foreign meddling in domestic affairs. In this case, Randolph allegedly requested French funds in order to support the 1794 Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania (McDougall, p. 30). Because of all of these disturbances which arose around the issue of aligning the United States with one country or another, it is no wonder that Hamilton and Washington concluded that “[t]he nation which indulges toward another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness is in some degree a slave.” Thus, the authors of the “Farewell Address” must have been convinced that Unilateralism was both a realistic policy that protected the state from foreign manipulation and an idealistic approach that preserved the tradition of Liberty in the domestic arena.

It should be clear, therefore, that the foreign policy principles enshrined in Washington’s “Farewell Address,” which outline the strategy of Unilateralism, were constructed on equally idealistic and realistic foundations. As they engaged other countries within the international system, Americans learned that the only manner to preserve the idealistic values on which their nation thrived was to limit the scope of these to the domestic arena. Americans also learned that at the time, it was necessary to conduct diplomacy in a realistic manner that strictly served US interests without making the country an easy target for foreign manipulation. Thus, although the current emphasis on multilateralism and international law tends to give the concept of “unilateralism” negative connotations, one must realize that under certain circumstances this does not have to be the case. The adoption of Unilateralism as a foreign policy tradition during the early history of the United States, which allowed this country to strengthen its republic while deflecting foreign interference, may arguably be seen as a necessary step in the creation of the more liberal international system which exists today and that this nation helped to establish. Students of history and international relations should thus pay close attention to the context within which foreign policies are developed before venturing to make what may turn out to be fallacious generalizations.